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Among the labo1·atory experimental studies of market price 
behavior there are numerous experiments designed on the basis of 
various bidding and auctioning processes of allocation. The theme 
of this conference will serve as the organizing principle of this paper 
which presents a summary of several published and previously 
unpublished experiments in auction and sealed-bid market behavior, 
I. VALUES, INSTITUTIONS AND :MARI\ET STRUCTURE AS 
TREATMENT VARIABLES 
In discussing the use of experimental ,methods to determine 
the equilibrium and dynamic properties of market price behavior 
it is. helpful to distinguish three classes of experimental market 
"treatment" variables: 
A. Individual values and their aggregation to form market values. 
In isolated single-commodity market experiments such values 
are defii1ed as the individual supply and demand schedules, or 
simply the aggregat(' supply and demand conditions that'bound 
price-quantity behavior. 
B. The institution of contract. This is defined as the entire set 
of rules and procedures of an experiment which taken together 
specify the process whereby individual subjects communicate, 
exchange information, and form binding contracts. 
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C, Market structure, This is defined by the number of participants 
(buyers and sellers) and their relative "power" in·the sense of 
relative demand or supply (cost) capacity. 
A complete set of marke� experiments can be viewed as providing 
observations on the mapping from values (supply and demand), insti­
tutions and market structure into price-quantity outcomes (price 
levels, price trajectories, quantities exchanged). That is, price­
quantity outcome = f (values, institutions, market structure), None 
of the experiments to be summarized in this report have systematically 
varied market structure except insofar as changes in the conditions 
of supply and demand have been effected by changing the number of 
sellers and buyers, But in each case reported here numbers are 
large enough and economic power sufficiently dispersed to yield 
competitive price behavior. However, empirically, "large" in this 
context typically means only about three or more sellers (and as many 
buyers) 
There are a number of laboratory studies (Hoggatt, 1959; 
Fouraker and Siegel, 1963; Friedman, 1963; Murphy, 1966) of duopoly 
and triopoly bargaining in which buyer response is simulated by the 
experimenter using a pre-specified demand function, This literature 
will not be treated here since it is only tangentially related to bidding 
. and auctioning, and has been very ably summarized by Friedman 
(1969). 
The institutions of contract that have been studied experimentally, 
and that will be summarized below, are defined as follows: .
(1) Double auctions, 
(i) In this market in each trading period of specified duration, 
any buyer is free at any time to make an oral bid to buy one 
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unit of a homogeneous commodity. Any seller is free at 
any time to make an oral offer to sell one unit. Any buyer 
is free to accept the offer of any seller and any seller to 
accept the bid of any buyer. An accepted bid or offer 
constitutes a binding contract, A given bid or offer is 
·outstanding until it is either accepted or another bid or 
offer is made. The new bid or offer does not have to pro­
vide better terms than a previous bid or offer, Hence, no 
"convergence rules 11 are imposed on bid and offer sequences, 
and only one (the last) bid or offer is outstanding at a time, 
Over-the-counter security markets and real estate markets 
have the feature that a bid or offer not accepted is not binding 
at a later time 'unless it is restated. 
(ii) A variation on the above institution is to write all bids and 
offers on a blackboard, visible to all, Following an initial 
unrestricted bid or offer, any new bid (offer) is admissible 
oniy if it is higher (lower) than the last bid (offer) until a 
contract occurs, When a contract occurs a new "auction" 
begins with an initial unrestricted bid or offer, and so on, 
The requirement that a new bid or offer provide better terms 
than the last is characteristic of organized trading as on the 
New York Stock Exchange (Leffler and Farwell, 1963, p. 187, 
191 ), 
(Z) Bid Auction, Buyers are free to make bids and sellers to accept 
bids as in the double auction, but sellers are not permitted to make 
offers. This procedure is typical of art auctions and auctions for 
the sale of farm animals and machinery, 
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(3) Offer Auctions. Sellers make offers and buyers may accept 
offers, but buyers cannot make bida. As an experimental 'treat­
ment variable this institution is the negative of the bid auction, 
(4) Posted Prieing, Under this institution each seller (buyer) 
independently selects a "take-it-or-leave-it" price offer (bid), 
i. e, .a price is selec;ted without knowledge of the prices being 
selected by competitors. These prices are then posted on a 
blackboard where they are visible to all buyers and sellers. 
Next a buyer (seller), chosen at random, selects a seller (buyer), 
and makes that seller (buyer) a quantity offer at his posted price, 
The seller (buyer) then responds with a quantity (any portion of 
the offer) acceptance which forms a binding contract. If some 
portion of the quantity offer is not accepted, the buyer (seller) 
may choose a second seller (buyer) and make a quantity offer, and 
so on, When the first buyer (seller) has finished his contracts, 
a second, chosen at random, selects a seller (buyer), makes a 
quantity offer, and so on, until all buyers (sellers) have completed 
their contracts, 
Most retail markets have the feature that sellers post 
prices which are not subject to alteration for some considerable 
period of time. Clothing merchants post selling prices for spring 
garments, Sears Roebuck publishes spring-summer and fall-winter 
catalogues of selling prices, and refiners post price bids at which 
they are willing to buy crude oil, In the experimental procedure, 
the fact that a given seller ma'y not satisfy the demand of a buyer 
corresponds to a stock-out in retail markets. That is, retailers 
post a price, and normally do not specify a quantity (except perhaps 
to say "while they last"), but stocks may be exhausted before all 
buyers are satisfied. 
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(5) Discriminative Sealed-bid Auction. In this institution in each 
trading period the seller offers a specified quantity, Q, of a 
homogeneous commodity and invites buye1's to tender bids inde­
pendently at stated prices for stated quantities of the good. The 
bids are arrayed from highest to lowest, and the first Q bid 
units are a.ccepted with a random device used for allocating 
among tie bids at the lowest accepted price, All accepted bids 
are then filled at their full bid prices. This procedure has been 
characteristic of the auctioning of U, S. Treasury bills. 
(6) Competitive Sealed-bid Auction, The rules are the same as in 
(5) except that all accepted bids are filled at the price of the 
lowest accepted bid.. This is approximately the procedure 
followed in the French auctioning of new stock issues (see 
McDonald and Jacquillat, 1974), 
As an experimental treatment variable the institution of 
contract is specified and controlled in any given experiment·through 
the design of subject instructions. To write the instructions for an 
e:-;periinental task is to define a trading institution in all its mechanical 
detail, For examples of instructions defining some of the above 
exchange institutions ·refer to Smith (1964, pp. 199-201; 1967, pp. 76-78), 
and Williams (1973, pp. 111-113). 
II. INDUCING CONTROLLED SUPpLY AND DEMAND CONDITIONS 
If (i) for every experimental subject more currency is 
better, i.e. if U(M) is a subject's unknown utility of money, with 
U'(M) > 0 for all M 2:_ 0, and (ii) the experimental task required to 
earn M is simple enough so that the subjective transactions cost 
(i, e. the disutility of learning, computing, and executing the experimental 
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procedures) is negligible, then actual monetary rewards can be used 
to induce value in the form of any predesigned demand or supply 
function on each subject, Aggregate market demand or supply will 
then be the quantity summation of these individual demand or supply 
functions. 
This is accomplished rather simply, The instructions inform 
a subject, say a buyer, that at the end of each of a series of trading 
periods the person will receive a sum of money R(q) - t pk , for units k=l 
purchased at prices p1, Pz• • • • , 
P 
q . R(q) is increasing and 
concave in q, the number of units of an abstract commodity purchased 
during the period. The classical definition of demand is the number of 
units that will be purchased as a function of a hypothetical fixed price P• 
Hence subject hypothetical utility is U[R(q) - pq], and for a maximum 
U' • (R' - p) = 0, or q - R'(-l )(p), if U' > O, where R'(-l)(p) is the 
induced individual demand valuation per trading period independent 
of the individual U function, The sum over all such buyer valuations 
defines the experimental market demand schedule (as illustrated on 
the left of Charts 1 - 7), A subject seller is instructed that he will 
be paid �·p
k 
- C(q), for selling q units at prices p
1
, p , , , , , p , 
k=l 2 q 
where C(q) is increasing and convex in q, For a maximum of U(pq - C(q)J, 
U' • (p - C') = O, or q = c•(-l )(p), if U' > 0, where c•(-l)(p) is the induced­
individual supply valuation. Summing over such individual supply valua­
tions yields the experimental market supply (see Charts 1 - 7), 
By imposing the appropriate reward structure in this way 
it is possible to effect virtually complete control over the experimental 
conditions of supply and demand to study the effect of any given 
configuration on price adjustment° behavior, The experimenter always 
has compl�te knowledge of the conditions of supply and demand that 
generated a given sequence of observations, How much knowledge 
the subjects have is an experimental treatment variable, In the 
experiment reported here subjects only have knowledge of their own 
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supply or demand functions, A subject is therefore never in a position 
of having more knowledge of market conditions than any nonlaboratory 
economic agent, 
For experimental markets in which the supply and demand 
schedules are not too asymmetric .(i. e, total producer surplus is not 
greatly different from consumer surplus) and which are conducted over 
periods of less than 40-50 minutes, satisfactory results can often be 
obtained without actual m_onetary rewards, But motivation is likely 
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to be weak when subjects bargain for "points" so that results are more 
likely to be effected by boredom and the cost of transacting once the 
task becomes routine. 
Of the twenty experiments summarized here only the five 
whose results are exhibited in Charts 1-5 were conducted without 
actual cash profit rewards, 
III, DOUBLE AUCTIONS 
The motivation for selecting the double auction for extensive 
experimental study (Smith, 1962) was based on the conjecture that 
this institution was the one under which classical supply and demand 
theory· had the best chance of being validated, However, I did not 
seriously expect competitive price theory to be supported by these 
initial probes; such was the power and influence of the Chamberlin­
Robinson revolt against competition, But if competitive theory had 
validity under the double auction, this would provide the "control case" 
01• reference institution against which other forn1s of market 
organization could be compared. 
The salient features of the double auction experiments can be 
listed as follows: 
I, No subject is given any information on the cost or revenue schedules 
provided to the other subjects or on the number of buyers or sellers, 
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or on the level at which contract prices might occur, A subject 
only has information on his own cost or revenue conditions,. 
the 
bids or offers being made, and the p.rices at which cDntracts are 
executed. 
2, Any buyer (seller) can make an oral price bid (offer) for one unit at 
a time. Any seller (buyer) can accept the bid (offer) of any buyer 
(seller), 
3(i) A bid (offer) is outstanding only until it is either accepted or a new 
bid or offer is made, whether or not the new bid or offer provides 
better terms than the last, Consequently there is only one, quotation 
(a bid or an offer) outstanding at any one time. 
3(ii) A bid (offer) is outstanding until it is either accepted or a new 
bid (offer) is made, A new bid (offer) is admissible only if it 
provides bettor terms, i. e, is higher (lower) than the previous 
bid (offer), Once a first bid and a first offer have been made, 
thereafter two quotations (one bid and one offer) will be outstanding 
at any one time, When a contract is executed a new "auction" begins 
with a new bid or offer which need not provide better terms than 
the last. 
4, The market is conducted over a sequence of several market 
periods with constant controlled conditions of supply and demand 
from period to period. 
5, No subject participated in more than one experiment in order to 
control on previous trader knowledge and experience, ·This 
specification provides minimum conditions of knowledge and 
experience, 
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The contract price sequences for twelve double auction 
experiments are shown in Charts 1-7, In each chart the controlled 
experimental market supply and demand are shown on the left, The 
presentation and discussion of these results will be organized to 
lllustrate five empirical propositions, 
Proposition 1. Contract prices converge to "near" the theoretical 
(Supply = Demand) equilib�ium level usually within the first twenty 
to thirty transactions, The more slowly converging markets are 
associated with very asymmetric supply and demand (producer surplus 
is substantially differe;,t from consumer surplus). 
The concept of prices being "near" the competitive equilibrium 
eludes satisfactory, pre�ise, objective definition. The requirement 
that, beyond some transaction or period, every contract be at the 
competitive equilibrium price is precise but clearly too strong although 
such results are obtainable as in the second experiment in Chart 7, 
All econometric studies of individual markets allow for noise in the 
competitive price hypothesis, A requirement that contract prices 
differ from the monopoly and monopsony levels by statistically signi­
ficant amounts, is precise but much too weak as is evident in the contract 
price sequences in Charts 1-7, There are few if any trading periods In 
these sequences for which the monopsony and monopoly price hypotheses 
would fail to be rejected at high levels of significance, Such tests 
might be impressive but not very relevant. What is missing in 
competitive price theory are adequate price adjustment models that 
permit more definitive statements about the characteristics of equilibrium, 
The assertion that all of the double auction experiments reported in 
Charts 1-7 converge to "near" the competitive equilibrium is neither 
very objective nor precise, but I have found in oral presentations that 
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virtually all observers agree subjectively that convergence is "good " 
or "remarkable, 11 in these experiments, 
The experiment in Chart 1 illustrates a case in which contract 
prices tend to equilibrium in the sense that every contract price is within 
the range $ 1. 75 to $2.25 between the first intramarginal seller and buyer 
valuations. The contracts in Chart 2 are relatively more erratic than 
in Chart l, but by trading period 3 have converged very closely to the 
equilibrium price. The two experiments in Charts 3 and 4 illustrate 
the effect of doubling the supply and the demand of each trader. In 
Chart 3 each subject could buy (or sell) one unit per trading period, 
while in Chart 4 two units could be bought (or sold) in each trading 
period, Consequently, in Chart 4, there is roughly as much convergence 
in one trading period as there is in two trading periods of Chart 3, This 
suggests that convergence is related to transaction experience, not just 
to "trading period" experience, Similarly, in Chart 5 each buyer and seller 
had multiunit revenue and cost schedules, and the larger volume of 
transactions produced substantial convergence by the end of the first 
trading period, 1 
The three experiments in Chart 7 provide the most rigorous 
test of the equilibrating power of the double auction.2 In these experiments 
all rent, or pure profit, is allocated to buyers at the competitive 
equilibrium price, The eleven buyers each receive $1.10 in trading 
profit per period plus a 5 cent commission, while eleven of the sixteen 
successful sellers receive only the 5 cent commission, In all three 
replications sellers resist the ten?ency for prices to decline to seller 
unit cost, but by period 4 most contracts are very near the equilibrium, 
$3. 10, 
1 1  
Proposition 2, Quantities exchanged per period rarely differ from the 
theoretical (S = D) equilibrium by more than a single unit in �trading 
period. 
This propositiqn is supported in every trading period for all 
the experiments in Charts 1-4, 6, 7, The exception is the multiunit 
case in Chart 5 in which there were no cash rewards, and the experimental 
task was made more difficult by giving the subjects multiunit revenue 
and cost schedules rather than single unit costs and resale prices as 
in the other experiments, However, other multiunit experiments using 
cash rewards (Plott and Smith, 1975) and the bid auction institution 
did not yield a deficient volume of transactions, This suggests that 
the proposition holds vel,'y broadly when motivation is based on cash 
rewards. 
The fact that the quantities exchanged are very close to the 
theoretical quantity even in the initial period when there is the least 
amount of information is especially significant, An examination of 
individual trades reveals that even in the first tradi�g period it is 
common for submarginal buyers and sellers to be unable to make 
contracts (cf, Smith, 1962, Table 1, p. 117), Auction markets are 
therefore quite efficient in excluding submarginal units even before 
contract prices have ·converged to their final levels, Consequently the 
more erratic price variations observed initially have a much greater 
effect on income distribution than upon allocative efficiency (Plott and 
Smith, 1975), 
Proposition 3, A variation on the double auction rules in which a bid 
(offer) is not admissible unless it provides better terms than the 
previous bid (offer) does not appear to provide any significa�t increase 
in the convergence rate of contract prices. 
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This proposition arose from an attempt to test the hypothesis 
that convergence would be more rapid when the auction rqles required 
a bid or an offer to provide improved terms, Four experiments with 
identical and symmetrical market supply and demand schedules (Chart·6) 
w
'
ere conducted each with a different set of subjects,3 Two of the experi­
ments, designated l (i) and 2(i) used the double auction variation (i) above, 
while two of the experiments designated l(ii) and 2(ii) used variation (ii) 
requiring bids and offers to improve. From the contract price sequences 
alone it is not evident that differences due to the treatment variable 
(compare the charts vertically) are any greater than differences due 
to sampling (subject) variation (compare the charts horizontally), 
Table l compares the varfance of contract prices period 
by period pooled across the two experimental sessions, under 
the two treatment conditions. In periods 2 through 4 the variance is 
significantly greater (a< ,l 0) under rule (i) than rule (ii), but in periods 
I i and 5 the variance ratio is less than unity, These comparisons do not 
inspire confidence in the hypothesis that rules requiring bids and offers 
to improve will speed convergence in the sense .of .reducing period-by­
period variance. The hypothesis may be true but the effect too small 
to be established without a large number of experimental replications. 
Proposition 4. The sampling variation (among different subject groups) 
in market price adjustment paths is considerable, but the variation in 
equilibrium prices (contract prices in the final period of trading) is 
minor. 
Th·e four experiments in Chart 6 tend to support this proposition, 
All four experiments yield contracts very
. 
near the $2. l 0 equilibrium 
in periods 4 and 5, yet !(ii) converges from above, 2(i) converges 
generally from below, while l(i) and 2(ii) exhibit greater price variation 
than the other two experiments. Chart 7 exhibits the results of three 
double auction experiments using identical supply and demand but 
Trading 
Period 
2 
3 
4 
5 
TABLE 1 
.06344 
.04023 
.01766 
.00506 
.00133 
2 a. l 
.10580 
.01542 
.00266 
.00246 
,00138 
13 
0.60 
2.61 
6.65 
2.06 
1.00 
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different subject groups. The variation in the contract price sequences 
is entirely attributable to differences among the three subject samples 
of size 27 each. Thus in the second experiment only one first�period 
contract is below $3.50, whereas in the third experiment only one is 
above $3,50. The price paths are markedly different, but fourth 
period contracts are all very near the $3 ,10 equilibrium. 
Proposition 5. Contrac,t price �onvergence is more likely to be from 
below (above) when producer's surplus is greater (less) than consumer's 
surplus, 
Clearly, in Char!' 7, such experimental markets m\tst 
converge from above if sellers are to sell at a positive profit. 
Less extreme cases, such as in Charts 3 and 4, should rarely 
if ever converge from above, Chart 6 supports proposition 5 
by illustrating the greater variability in convergence mode (from above, 
below, or random around the equilibrium) when producer's and consumer's 
surplus are equal. 
The empirical evidence summarized in Charts 1-7 provides 
very strong support for static competitive· price theory when markets 
are organized on the principle of the double auction. It is also clear 
that the information requirements for the achievement ££competitive 
eguilibrium prices � very weak, The argument of Knight, Stigler 
and Chamberlin (see Shubik; 1959, pp. 169-171) and of many textbook 
authors, that "perfect inform
_
ation and price "taking" behavior are re­
quired for establishing competitive prices, is not supported by the experi­
mental evidence, On the other hand Marshall's ( 1949, p. 333-334) famous 
description of market price determination in a hypothetical corn market 
is not contradicted by this evidence. The position of Hayek(l945) that an 
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.important feature of decentralized pricing is that it economizes on 
information, is also consistent with the results of these double auction 
experiments, Marshall (p. 334) also notes perceptively that it is not 
necessary for the competitive price argument "that any dealers should, 
have a thorough knowledge of the circumstances of the market. " 
There a1•e no experimental results more important or more significant 
than that the information specifications of traditional competitive 
price theory are grossly overstated. The experimental facts are 
that no double auction trader needs to !mow anything about the valuation 
conditions of other traders, or have �understanding or knowledge 
of market supply and demand conditions, or have� trading experience 
(although experience may speed convergence), or satisfy the quaint 
and irrelevant requirement of being a �rice "taker" (every trader is 
a price maker in the double auction). 
IV. COMPARISON OF BID, DOUBLE AND OFFER AUCTIONS
One-sided oral auctions lead to contracts tending to favor 
the silent side, If only buyers quote prices (the bid auction), the bids
tend to begin much below the competitive equilibrium but thereafter 
to rise because not all such bids are accepted (there is excess demand), 
As buyers raise bids competitively to induce sales, sellers learn 
that it is to their advantage to wait, i. e, the more silent role of sellers 
is an aid to tacit collusion. Contract prices tend to rise above the 
competitive equilibrium, but the rise is limited by the fact that the 
resulting excess supply causes some queuing on the part of sellers to 
accept bids, This queuing is expressed in the form of ties by two or 
more sellers to accept a bid. The process is reversed when sellers 
make offers, 
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Proposition 6. Let Fk(P), Fb(P), and Fb(P) be the number (or
percentage) of contract prices executed at P or greater in trading 
period t > 1 under the bid, double, and offer auctions respectively·. 
Then 
That is,. prices in the b,id auction stochastically dominate prices in 
the double auction which stochastically dominate prices in the offer 
auction. ·Hence, contracts tend to be executed to the disadvantage of 
the side having the price initiative. 
Chart 8 illustrates the empirical distribution of contract 
prices in successive trading periods for six experiments consisting 
of two replications under each of these three treatment institutions 
(see Smith, 1964), The two "control" experiments using the double 
auction rules are those labeled 1 (i) and Z(i) in Chart 6. The supply 
and demand designs are the same as those appearing on the left of 
Chart 6. The dominance relation stated in proposition 6 is supported 
by these data and is statistically significant (Smith, 1964, pp. 189-192). 
These results suggest that both the dynamic and. equilibrium properties 
of exchange prices may be affected by the institutional rules or 
practices governing price initiative (Plott and Smith, 1975 ), 
V. POSTED-BID VERSUS POSTED-OFFER INSTITUTIONS 
The first experimental investigation of posted pricing and 
the determination of its effect on ,competitive equilibrium is due to 
Williams (1973). Empirically he. establishes that when buyers post 
bids, contract prices are lower than when sellers post offers, This 
is the reverse of the result from comparing the oral bid and offer 
auctions; posted pricing operates to the advantage of the price 
initiator, The process of posting a "take-it-or-leave-it" price 
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(for all units to be offered) tends to support collusive coordination 
among independent traders. The fact that only inter-period price 
adjustments are possib_le, retards and perhaps prevents equilibrium 
convergence, 
Propes ition 7. t t Let GB(P) and Go(P) be the number (or percentage) 
of contract prices executed at P or greater in trading period t > 1 
under the posted-bid and posted-offer institutions respectively. Then 
That is, pi-ices in the posted-bid institution stochastically dominate 
prices in the posted-offer institution. 
The empirical bid distributions ok(P) and Gb(P) are shown 
in Chart 9 for six trading periods of four experimental sessions 
reported by Williams (1973, p. 102), The data from two sessions 
using posted bids are combined period-by-period to generate the 
distribution G�(P). Two sessions using posted offers are coml)ined to 
genei•ate Gb(P). The dominance relation of proposition 7 is supported 
by these data, and is statistically significant ( Williams, 1973, p. 104-
105), The results of the posted-bid sessions of Williams have been 
replicated (Plott and Smith, 1975) using a different subject pool 
and modified instructions, Will.lams' results appear to be very 
robust, 
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VI, SEALED-BID AUCTIONS 
Six sealed-bid auction experiments have been reported by
Smith (1967). Belovicz (1967) has considerably extended this work 
in a study consisting of twenty-seven sealed-bid auctions conducted 
under a variety of different conditions. The experimental paradigm 
is one in wh.ich subjects su?mit sealed bids for eighteen units of a 
commodity that can be resold at a price determined by a rectangular 
distribution over the nine prices $1.15 to $1.95 (Chart 10). The 
purchase cost is determined as described in either paragraphs (5) 
or (6) of section I. 
Using the discriminitive rules subjects tend to submit lower 
bids than when the competitive rules a·re used. This is because the 
accepted bids are filled at the full bid price. Under the competitive 
rules an accepted bid is filled at the lowest accepted bid price, and 
profit is independent of the bid price· submitted, Consequently, there 
is an incentive to bid higher to as sure acceptance with no penalty in 
the form of higher purchase cost when the bid is above the lowest 
accepted bid. 
Proposition 8. Let H�(B) and H�(B) be the number of bids accepted 
at B or greater in trading period t > 0 in the competitive and 
discriminative sealed-bid auctions, respectively. Then 
That is, accepted bids in the competitive sealed-bid auction stochasti­
cally dominate bids in the discriminative sealed-bid auction, 
Chart 10 compares the bid distributions H�(B) and' H�(B) for 
three different sets of paired competitive-discriminative experiments, 
In the top pair, each of thirteen subjects in each experiment submitted 
up to two bids each per trading period providing eight rejected bids. 
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In the middle pair there were twelve rejected bids (fifteen subjects), 
and in the last pair there were sixteen rejected bids (seventeen 
subjects). The dominance relation of proposftion 8 is supported in 
all three comparisons. :Belovicz (1967) in a mu�h more compre­
hensive study establishes that this block of experimental results can 
be independently replicated. 
VII, CONCLUSION 
The potential of experimental analysis for the study of bidding 
and auctioning processes has very wide but as yet undefined bounds, 
I am not aware of any exchange process that could not be studied 
experimentally in some simplified form. The value of such studies 
cannot be fully assessed at this"time, Perhaps the most important 
ultimate value is to provide a rigorous testing of our ability to model 
elementary behavior before confronting such models with field data. 
This is partly illustrated in the study of the French sealed-bid auction 
(McDonald and Jacquillat, 1974) in which the authors build upon the 
results of competitive sealed-bid auction experiments to test the effi­
ciency
, 
of the French marketing of new stock issues. Another possibility 
is· to provide empirical justification and preliminary experience for the 
design of field experiments. This is especially well illustrated in some 
of the bond marketing experiments by the U.S. Treasury reported at 
this conference. Some of these field policy experiments seek to assess 
the effect of competitive auction rules and were undertaken with knowl­
edge of the laboratory experimental results on competitive versus 
discriminative auctions, Finally, experimental methodology has potential 
in exploring the policy implications of new institutions, or alterations 
in existing institutional rules, Experimental studies of exchange insti­
tutions has the potential of increasing our understanding of decentralized 
allocation processes with implications for antitrust policy and the use 
of decentralized institutional forms of market regulation and co.nstraint. 
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FOOTNOTES 
l, Charts l - 4 are reproduced from Smith (1962). Chart 5 reports a 
previously unpublished experiment. 
2. The second and third experiments in Chart 7 are reproduced from 
Smith (1965), while the first is previously unpublished, 
3. Experiments l {i) and 2{i) are reproduced from Smith (1964), while 
1 {ii) and 2{ii) are previously unpublished. 
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